Arkansas Law Review
Volume 73

Number 1

Article 7

August 2020

McCulloch and the American Regime
Mark A. Graber
University of Maryland

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/alr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Legal History Commons, and the
Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Mark A. Graber, McCulloch and the American Regime, 73 Ark. L. Rev. 95 (2020).
Available at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/alr/vol73/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Arkansas Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact
scholar@uark.edu.

MCCULLOCH AND THE AMERICAN REGIME
Mark A. Graber*
Professor David S. Schwartz’s magnificent The Spirit of the
Constitution: John Marshall and the 200-Year Odyssey of
McCulloch v. Maryland1 explicitly challenges how we teach government powers in first weeks or semester of constitutional law
and implicitly challenges how we teach civil rights and liberties
in later weeks or second semester of constitutional law.2 Contrary
to the impression given in many classes on the constitutional law
of national powers,3 no straight line exists from the Marshall
opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland to the New Deal and beyond.
Schwartz meticulously details how, for two-hundred years, different aspects of McCulloch have been used, abused, or ignored
in light of the dominant constitutional ethos of the time. Both
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in
National Federation of Independent Businesses4 claimed to be
Marshallian, even as they offered constitutional visions that
sharply diverged from each other and almost as sharply diverged
from that of the McCulloch opinion.5 Professor Schwartz’s history of McCulloch subverts the common decision to discuss government powers in the first part or semester of constitutional law
* Regents Professor, University of Maryland Carey School of Law. Thanks to Mark
Killenbeck for the opportunity to write and David Schwartz for writing a wonderful book.
1. DAVID S. SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION: JOHN MARSHALL AND
THE 200-YEAR ODYSSEY OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (2019).
2. Some law schools require a two-semester constitutional law sequence. Others require one, typically four-hour, constitutional law class. The vast majority of these constitutional law classes use casebooks whose initial chapters discuss the constitutional law of
structures/powers and later chapters discuss the constitutional law of rights/liberties. See,
e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (6th ed. 2020); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET
AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 2005); NOAH R. FELDMAN & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (20th ed. 2019).
3. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2 (moving immediately from McCulloch to National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius).
4. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
5. See infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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and fundamental rights in the second part or semester of constitutional law. The Spirit of the Constitution highlights how McCulloch is central to questions of slavery and race that often form the
bulk of the second part or semester of constitutional law.6 For
most of the nineteenth century, government power was the crucial
instrument for ensuring that Americans enjoyed certain fundamental rights. Interpretations of McCulloch determined the scope
of that national power. Progressives turned to McCulloch in the
1960s for the government powers necessary to combat Jim Crow.
If strengthening national legislatures ought to be central to progressive efforts to turn back right-wing populist movements
throughout the universe of constitutional democracy,7 then
McCulloch ought to be as canonical a decision for the constitutional politics of fundamental rights as that decision is for the constitutional politics of government powers.
A. The Constitutional Law of Structures/Powers Story
The Spirit of the Constitution is primarily devoted to the
checkered history of McCulloch as a precedent for broad government powers. Schwartz points out that McCulloch when initially
decided was an expression of “defensive” constitutional nationalism8 that largely failed.9 John Marshall and the Federalist/National Republican majority on the Court sought to provide constitutional foundations for National Republican legislative projects
that were under attack from the Old Republicans who later became core members of the Jacksonian Democratic coalition.10
McCulloch may have won the battle in 1819, but the antebellum
opponents of broad interpretation of federal powers won the war.
By the 1840s, Henry Clay’s American System was in shambles.
Numerous efforts in Congress to incorporate a national bank,
sponsor internal improvements, and promote domestic industry
6. See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
7. See Mark A. Graber, What’s in Crisis? The Postwar Constitutional Paradigm,
Transformative Constitutionalism, and the Fate of Constitutional Democracy, in
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? 665, 668 (Mark A. Graber et al., eds., 2018).
8. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 5.
9. Id. at 87-110.
10. See generally Michael J. Klarman, How Great were the “Great” Marshall Court
Decisions, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111 (2001); Mark A. Graber, Federalist or Friends of Adams:
The Marshall Court and Party Politics, 12 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 229 (1998).
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through protective tariffs either failed to pass the national legislature or were vetoed by Jacksonian presidents.11 Abraham Lincoln
during the debates with Stephen Douglas proclaimed that these
precedents constitutionally settled that the federal government
had no power to incorporate a national bank.12
McCulloch became a permanent presence in the American
constitutional law of national powers only during the late New
Deal when liberal justices committed to the administrative state
repeatedly invoked that decision and Gibbons v. Ogden13 in opinions sustaining federal legislation. The common claim that
“McCulloch ‘laid the foundations for the modern welfare state’
. . . may not reflect the intentions of the Marshall Court,”
Schwartz notes, “but there is little doubt that McCulloch came to
be interpreted this way.”14 McCulloch played a crucial role in the
two most important cases that signaled the arrival of the New Deal
commerce clause. United States v. Darby15 cited McCulloch for
two crucial propositions when obliterating the line between federal and state power that had structured the constitutional law of
11. See Andrew Jackson, Veto Messages, in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 483-93 (James D. Richardson, ed., 1897) (no power to finance
local improvements) [hereinafter MESSAGES AND PAPERS]; id. at 576-91 (no power to establish a national bank); John Tyler, Veto Message, in 4 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 63-71 (James D. Richardson, ed., 1897) (no power to incorporate a bank); id. 330-33 (no power to improve navigation of rivers); James K. Polk,
Veto Messages, in 4 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS,
460-66 (James D. Richardson, ed., 1897) (no power to construct local improvements); id. at
610-26 (no power to construct local improvements); Franklin Pierce, Veto Messages, in 5 A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 247-56 (James D. Richardson, ed., 1897) (no power to construct hospitals for the insane); id. at 256-71 (no power
to make local improvements); id. at 386-88 (no power to make internal improvements);
James Buchanan, Veto Messages, in 5 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS, 543-50 (James D. Richardson, ed., 1897) (no power over education); id.
at 599-607 (no power to make local improvements); id. at 608-614 (no power to give public
lands away to settlers). See also Mark A. Graber, Resolving Political Questions into Judicial
Questions: Toqueville’s Thesis Revisited, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 485, 534-35 (2004). Jacksonian members of Congress also rejected national power to incorporate a bank. See CONG.
GLOBE, 25th Cong. 1st Sess. app. 96 (1837).
12. Sixth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Quincy, Illinois (Oct. 13, 1958), in 3 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 245, 278 (Roy P. Basler eds., 1953) (arguing
that Jackson and the Democrats reversed McCulloch “as completely as any decision ever
was reversed––so far as its practical operation is concerned”).
13. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
14. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 213.
15. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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federal powers for over a century. The first citation was for the
proposition, “[t]he power of Congress over interstate commerce
. . . extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate
commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to
make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a
legitimate end.”16 The second citation was for the proposition,
“[f]rom the beginning and for many years the [tenth] amendment
has been construed as not depriving the national government of
authority to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power
which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end.”17
Justice Robert Jackson’s opinion in Wickard v. Fillburn cited
McCulloch for the proposition, central to New Deal liberalism,
that the “conflicts of economic interest between the regulated and
those who advantage by it are wisely left under our system to resolution by the Congress under its more flexible and responsible
legislative process.”18
McCulloch in the twenty-first century became a celebrity citation on questions of national power.19 One feature of celebrity
citations is that the reference is famous, like Paris Hilton at the
turn of the twenty-first century, simply for being famous.
Schwartz points to the elements of a celebrity citation when he
observes,
McCulloch rarely does any real doctrinal work in modern
Supreme Court decisions, despite the fact that it has been
cited in over 130 opinions since 1969. Most of the time, the
justices used McCulloch as a symbol for a very abstract point
or to signal the importance of the constitutional issue it was
deciding.20

A second feature of celebrity citations is that all parties on all
sides of constitutional controversies cite that text as supporting
their position. McCulloch as such a celebrity citation was front
and center when the Supreme Court considered the
16. Id. at 118-19.
17. Id. at 124; See SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 219-23.
18. 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942).
19. For discussions of celebrity citations, see Mark A. Graber, The Declaration of Independence and Contemporary Constitutional Pedagogy, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 509, 518-20
(2016); Mark A. Graber, The Prince of Fame: Brown as Celebrity, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 939,
943-44, 1004-13 (2008).
20. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 238.
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constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act. Chief Justice Roberts was certain John Marshall was on his side. His opinion striking down the individual mandate cited McCulloch for the proposition that “the Federal Government ‘can exercise only the powers
granted to it.’”21 Justice Ginsburg was as certain that John Marshall would have been as supportive of Obamacare as he was of
the Bank of the United States. She cited McCulloch for the proposition that “the Constitution was of necessity a ‘great outline,’
not a detailed blueprint.”22 As good constitutional lawyers, neither Roberts nor Ginsburg was at all perturbed by their invoking
a turn of the nineteenth century jurist to resolve a twenty-first century problem that jurist could never have imaged, using a twentyfirst century conceptual apparatus that jurist could not have comprehended.
B. The Constitutional Law of Rights/Liberties Story
McCulloch is always present, sometimes present by absence,
Schwartz details, when slavery and race are on the table. The first
debates over national power were as animated by concerns over
federal power to regulate slavery as by concerns over the national
bank or internal improvements.23 Southerners objected to the apparently broad definitions of federal power in McCulloch and
Gibbon v. Ogden because they feared precedents that might license the federal government to restrict the slave trade and, perhaps, human bondage. John Randolph famously declared that a
Marshallian understanding of national power would give Congress the power to “emancipate every slave in the United
States.”24 James Madison objected to McCulloch in part because
latitudinous constructions of federal authority might license federal bans on slavery in the territories.25 Such southern Federalists
21. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 534-35 (2012) (internal citations omitted). See id. at 654 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (citing
McCulloch for the proposition that the individual mandate was “not ‘consistent[ent] with the
letter and spirit of the constitution’”).
22. Id. at 601 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part) (internal citations omitted).
23. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 35-38, 98-99.
24. 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 1308 (1856); see also JOHN TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTION
CONSTRUED, AND CONSTITUTIONS VINDICATED 313-14 (Richmond, Shepherd & Pollard
1820).
25. See infra note 35.
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as James Wayne performed daring feats of legal gymnastics when
explaining why broad federal powers over commerce did not entail any federal power over slavery.26
Concerns over national power in the early republic often
trenched on matters commonly taught in Constitutional Law II or
in the rights and liberties portion of the single constitutional law
course. National Republicans and Whigs saw federal power as a
means for advancing Protestant moral virtues and for promoting
national commercial prosperity.27 They sought to build a national
university and ensure school systems with particular curricula.28
Many derived national programs promoting such social services
as hospitals from constitutional commitments to ensuring the welfare of the citizenry that constitutionalists in later periods would
claim to be positive rights. After calling for internal improvements, a national university, an “astronomical observatory,” John
Quincy Adams concluded his First Annual Message by claiming,
if these powers and others enumerated in the Constitution
may be effectually brought into action by laws promoting the
improvement of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures,
the cultivation and encouragement of the mechanic and elegant arts, the advancement of literature, and the progress of
the sciences, ornamental and profound, to refrain from exercising them for the benefit of the people themselves would
be to hide in the earth the talent committed to our charge—
would be treachery to the most sacred of trusts.29

For John Quincy Adams and other Whigs, national power was a
means for promoting a particular kind of regime rather than
simply a means for growing the economy. Adams and his supports did not cite McCulloch when championing their vision of
26. Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 428-29 (1849) (Wayne, J., concurring).
27. See DANIEL WALKER HOWE, THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE AMERICAN WHIGS
8-9 (Univ. of Chi. Press ed., 1979) (discussing the Whig political culture as focusing on
increasing total national wealth and as ensuring the entire society converted to Protestantism
and its values).
28. See Elizabeth Beaumont, Education and the Constitution: Defining the Contours
of Governance, Rights, and Citizenship, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 967, 970-71 (Mark Tushnet, Mark A. Graber, & Sanford Levinson eds.,
2015); see also GEORGE THOMAS, THE FOUNDERS AND THE IDEA OF A NATIONAL
UNIVERSITY 47-48 (2015).
29. John Quincy Adams, First Annual Message, in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra
note 11, at 313-16.
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the national powers necessary to create their Protestant regime,
but Marshallian premises underlay the construction of that polity.30
McCulloch moved out of the background when Americans
debated the status of slavery in the territories. Schwartz appreciates that crucial issues in Dred Scott v. Sandford31 revolved
around McCulloch’s understanding of “‘needful.’”32 One issue in
Dred Scott was whether Article IV, Section 3, paragraph 2, which
declares, “The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make
all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other
property belonging to the United States,” authorized the national
legislature to forbid human bondage north of the Missouri Compromise line. Justice John McLean cited McCulloch for the proposition that “needful rules and regulations” gave Congress the
power to ban slavery in all American territories. “[T]he extent of
those ‘needful regulations,’” he derived from Marshall’s opinion,
“depends upon the direction of Congress, where the means are
appropriate to the end, and do not conflict with any of the prohibitions of the Constitution.”33 Justice Peter Daniel, advancing a
southern understanding of “necessary,” insisted that banning slavery in the territories was unconstitutional because doing so was
not sufficiently necessary.34 Madison took this view forty years
earlier. In language that echoed his previous criticism of McCulloch,35 the former president informed a correspondent that the

30. But see CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3rd Sess. 1376 (1871) (statement of Rep. Townsend) (citing McCulloch as supporting a “national system of education”).
31. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
32. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 105-07.
33. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 542 (McLean, J., dissenting); see also Id. at 61415 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (“[T]he question whether a particular rule or regulation be needful,
must be finally determined by Congress itself. Whether a law be needful, is a legislative or
political, not a judicial, question. Whatever Congress deems needful is so, under the grant of
power.”); CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 1162 (1858) (statement of Sen. Trumbull)
(citing McCulloch to justify federal bans on slavery in the territories).
34. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 491-92 (Daniel, J., concurring).
35. James Madison sets forth his criticism of McCulloch in his September 2, 1819 letter
to Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals Judge Spencer Roane. See Letter from James Madison to Judge Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF
THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 359, 359-62 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1973).
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territorial clause merely gave Congress “a power to make the provisions really needful or necessary for the government of settlers.”36
McCulloch in the debate over slavery in the territories involved regime principles far broader than a commitment to national commercial prosperity. Eric Foner notably details how Republican opponents of slavery had a constitutional commitment
to a free labor society.37 Congressional power created the conditions under which contract would be the fundamental relationship
between persons. The ban on slavery in the territories was only
one aspect of a Republican congressional program that would facilitate a west settled by farmers and others committed to a free
labor regime. The Republican Platform of 1860 called for a
“complete and satisfactory homestead measure,” “river and harbor improvements of a national character,” and “a railroad to the
Pacific Ocean.”38 During the Civil War, some Republicans began
explicitly citing McCulloch as the foundation of this free labor
regime. As important, Republicans called for congressional legislation rather than judicial decree as the vehicle for establishing
that free labor regime. Nowhere in the Republican Party Platforms of 1856, 1860, and 1864 was any suggestion made that the
courts were the institution primarily responsible for protecting
rights in the promised anti-slavery polity.
The post-Civil War amendments incorporated McCulloch’s
understanding of national power as fundamental to the creation of
a new American rights regime. Schwartz details how Republicans repeatedly insisted that the enforcement clauses of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments vested Congress
with the same powers to implement the constitutional ban on slavery and guarantee of fundamental rights as John Marshall maintained Congress had to implement the provisions of Article I, Section 8. 39 McCulloch was the appropriate precedent because
36. Letter from James Madison to Robert Walsh (Nov. 27, 1819), in 3 LETTERS AND
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON FOURTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 149,
152 (1865). Taney insisted the territorial clause was inapplicable to territories on the west
side of the Mississippi. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 432.
37. See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN 11-39 (1970).
38. Republican Party Platform of 1860, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (May 17,
1860), [https://perma.cc/8UYG-WEQT].
39. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 126-30.

OTHER
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McCulloch was about the use of national power to achieve the
fundamental regime goals. Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, when championing the Civil Rights Act of 1875, cited
McCulloch for the proposition that “the Supreme Court will not
undertake to sit in judgment on the means employed by Congress
in carrying out a power which exists in the Constitution.”40 Representative James Wilson made the same argument when defending congressional power to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1866.41
Senator William Stewart of Nevada during the debates over the
Supplemental Reconstruction Act cited McCulloch for the proposition that: “If those who sustained the Union were right in their
theory that the Constitution authorized the suppression of the rebellion then the language of the Constitution itself plainly authorized Congress to pass all necessary laws to carry into execution
that power.”42 Representative George Hoar of Massachusetts
pointed to McCulloch as providing congressional authority to
pass the Civil Rights Act of 1871.43 Representative Robert S.
Hale during the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1875 pointed
to McCulloch as demonstrating why Congress had extensive
power to ban race discrimination under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.44
Republican accounts of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments during the late 1860s and early 1870s suggest that
had the framers followed practices in some constitutional democracies and engrafted the post-Civil War Amendments onto the
original Constitution,45 Article I, Section 8, which outlines the
powers of the national legislature, rather than Article I, Section
10, which constrains the power of state governments, would have
been the most appropriate location. Antislavery advocates insisted that the Thirteenth Amendment obligated the national

40. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 728 (1872).
41. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118 (1866).
42. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 929 (1868).
43. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 332 (1871). See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong.,
1st Sess. app. 202 (1871) (speech of Rep. Snyder).
44. 3 CONG. REC. 979 (1875).
45. Different methods of engrafting constitutional amendments on to the constitution
are illustrated in Richard Albert’s book. See RICHARD ALBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS: MAKING, BREAKING, AND CHANGING CONSTITUTIONS 229-40 (2019).
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legislature to adopt legislation ensuring that former slaves would
become full citizens. Wilson stated:
[W]e must see to it that the man made free by the Constitution of the United States, sanctioned by the voice of the
American people, is a freeman indeed; that he can go where
he pleases, work when and for whom he pleases; that he can
sue and be sued; that he can lease and buy and sell and own
property, real and personal; that he can go into the schools
and educate himself and his children; that the rights and
guarantees of the good old common law are his, and that he
walks the earth, proud and erect in the conscious dignity of
a free man, who knows that his cabin, however humble, is
protected by the just and equal laws of his country.46

Republicans often referred to the Fourteenth Amendment as guarantees enforceable by national power rather than as limits or constraints on government officials. Representative Robert Elliott of
South Carolina described Section One as a “constitutional guarantee against inequality and discrimination by appropriate legislation.”47 Republicans no doubt thought courts had some independent role to play in implementing the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments, perhaps akin to the dormant commerce
clause, but few antislavery advocates discussed the judicial role
during the ratification debates and debates over legislation implementing the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.48
Justice William Strong’s opinion in Ex parte Virginia spoke
for the original conception of the post-Civil War Amendments
when he pointed out,
It is not said the judicial power of the general government
shall extend to enforcing the prohibitions and to protecting
the rights and immunities guaranteed. It is not said that
branch of the government shall be authorized to declare void
any action of a State in violation of the prohibitions. It is the
power of Congress which has been enlarged Congress is authorized to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate legislation. Some legislation is contemplated to make the

46. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1865). See Mark A. Graber, The Second
Freedmen’s Bureau Bill’s Constitution, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1361, 1372-90 (2016).
47. 2 CONG. REC. 410 (1874). See 3 CONG. REC. app. 304 (1874) (statement of Sen.
Alcorn); 3 CONG. REC. 943 (1875) (statement of Rep. Lynch).
48. See Graber, supra note 46, at 1371-72.
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amendments fully effective. Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to
the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the
enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal
protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not
prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional
power.49

States could not exclude persons of color from juries because
Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1875 had prohibited racebased jury selection in the jury process.50 No Republican supporter of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 or federal court decision
handed down before 1875 presumed that federal courts could forbid states from excluding persons of color from juries in the absence of federal legislation implementing the Fourteenth Amendment.51
Free labor constitutionalism changed dramatically during
the late nineteenth century. Republicans in Congress and on the
federal bench converted the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments from national powers analogous to the commerce clause
into individual rights provisions analogous to the contracts clause.
By the turn of the century, the Supreme Court had become the
institution primarily responsible for implementing the post-Civil
War Amendments. Neither the majority nor dissenting opinion
in Plessy v. Ferguson52 examined or even mentioned federal statutory law or congressional debates when determining the constitutional legality of segregation in railway cars. The only contributions the elected branches made to the jurisprudence of the
freedom of contract instantiated by Lochner v. New York53 were
to pass vague laws that enable judicial policymaking54 and secure
the appointment of federal justices opposed to progressive

49. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879) (emphasis original).
50. See id. at 345; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879).
51. See Mark A. Graber, The Constitution of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 (2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
52. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
53. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
54. See generally GEORGE I. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE DEFERRALS: STATUTORY
AMBIGUITY, JUDICIAL POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2003).
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legislation.55 The few persons who bothered asking Congress for
civil rights legislation were rebuffed. The constitutional protections persons of color enjoyed before the Great Society came almost entirely from judicial decisions based directly on the Constitution of the United States.56
Americans partially reinvigorated the relationship between
rights and powers during the 1960s. Congress passed such pathbreaking legislation as the Civil Rights Act of 1964,57 the Voting
Rights Act of 1965,58 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.59 The
Supreme Court sustained these measures as appropriate exercises
of federal legislative power under the Civil War Amendments.60
The judicial supporters of these measures made ample reference
to McCulloch. Chief Justice Warren, when upholding the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, cited McCulloch for the proposition that the
commerce power “extends to those activities intrastate which so
affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to
the attainment of a legitimate end.”61 Warren in South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, when upholding the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
stated that Chief Justice Marshall “laid down the classic formulation” for determining the exercise of national powers when

55. See generally Walter F. Murphy, In His Own Image: Mr. Chief Justice Taft and
Supreme Court Appointments, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 159 (1961).
56. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953) (holding persons of color may
not be excluded from pre-primary voting by private organizations closely affiliated with political parties); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 662 (1944) (holding political parties cannot
prohibit persons of color from voting in primary elections); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
500 (1954); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S.
536, 541 (1927); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915). For exceptions, see Screws
v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
57. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
58. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
59. Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801-819, 82 Stat. 73, 81-89 (1968) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619).
60. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1964);
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). The Supreme Court sustained a
direct ancestor of the Fair Housing Act in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 42022 (1969).
61. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 258 (internal quotations omitted).
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sustaining the constitutionality of the national bank.62 In seven
opinions sustaining government power to promote civil rights and
civil liberties published between 1966 and 1970, the Supreme
Court quoted “the celebrated words of Chief Justice Marshall in
McCulloch v. Maryland,” ‘Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution,
are constitutional.’”63
A subtle difference nevertheless exists between the constitutional politics of Reconstruction and the constitutional politics of
the Great Society. Republicans during Reconstruction, the more
Radical Republicans in particular, conceptualized the post-Civil
War Amendments, the Thirteenth Amendment specifically, as declaring fundamental regime commitments to be implemented
largely, if not exclusively, by Congress.64 Great Society liberals
more often conceptualized the post-Civil War Amendments as declaring particular fundamental rights whose implementation was
shared in ways not fully developed in the 1960s by the Supreme
Court and Congress. With rare exception, members of Congress
and the justices focused on the constitutional power to protect individual rights, not the McCulloch power to secure the conditions
of a particular fundamental rights regime. Congress was empowered to pass legislation remedying, identifying, and preventing violations of the individual rights enumerated in the Thirteenth,
Fourteen, and Fifteenth Amendments.65 The Voting Rights Act
of 1965 forbade “the use of voter qualification laws where necessary to meet the risk of continued or renewed violations of
62. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (“the McCulloch v. Maryland standard is the measure of what constitutes ‘appropriate legislation’ under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
63. Jones, 392 U.S. at 443 (internal citations omitted). See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112, 143 (Douglas, J., concurring and dissenting); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at
650; United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 783-84 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring in part);
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 276
(Black, J., concurring); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 281 (Douglas, J., concurring). But see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 358 (Black, J. concurring in part)
(claiming the above quotation in McCulloch supports limiting power to protect voting
rights).
64. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
65. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1997).
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constitutional rights.”66 Congress refrained from adopting
measures promoting voting in the absence of constitutional rights
violations.67
C. The Constitutional Law of Structures/Powers/
Rights/Liberties Story
The Spirit of the Constitution suggests that constitutional
pedagogy and development might benefit from further breaking
down the barriers between constitutional powers and constitutional rights. Americans have historically acknowledged the relationships between government structures and constitutional
rights. Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 1 asserted that “the
vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty.”68 In
Federalist 31, he declared, “all observations founded upon the
danger of usurpation ought to be referred to the composition and
structure of the government, not to the nature or extent of its powers.”69 The persons responsible for the Civil War Constitution understood how a liberty regime collapsed the distinction between
rights and powers. Conservatives on the Roberts Court echo this
conjunction of powers and rights when they repeatedly declare
that federalism is a vital protection for liberty,70 although how in
their opinions state rights promote freedom seems obscure to
many progressives.71 Progressives are often less sensitive to potential relationships between Article I, Section 8 and the Fourteenth Amendment. Jesse Choper suggests the Supreme Court
should focus exclusively on individual rights, treating questions
66. S. REP. NO. 89-162, pt. 3, at 19 (1965).
67. One might compare H.R.1—For the People Act of 2019, 116th Congress, which
after declaring “It is the policy of the United States that . . . all eligible citizens of the United
States should access and exercise their constitutional right to vote in a free, fair, and timely
manner” outlines such policies as same day registration that promote voting, even though
not designed to remedy, identify, or prevent constitutional violations. For the People Act of
2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. (2019), [https://perma.cc/6F2W-PF9U].
68. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 35 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
69. THE FEDERALIST NO. 31, at 196 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
70. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 536 (2012) (quoting New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992)) (“federalism secures to citizens the liberties
that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power”) (internal quotations omitted); Bond v.
United States, 564 U.S. 211, 222 (2011) (“the individual liberty secured by federalism”).
71. See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 595 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part).

2020

SCHOLARSHIP IN REVIEW

109

of government powers as non-justiciable.72 A constitutional law
class that begins by exploring McCulloch in the context of Federalist 1, Federalist 31, and the post-Civil War Amendments
might provide foundations for a better constitutional law and politics that harnesses national power for human freedom as well as
for material prosperity.
Professor Schwartz provides constitutional Civil War buffs
who identify with radical Republicans some cause for optimism.
The meaning and significance of McCulloch, he points out, has
changed as American constitutional commitments have
changed.73 Our McCulloch is not the McCulloch of 1819, 1869,
1919, or 1969. Perhaps inspired by creative reinterpretations of
McCulloch throughout history, progressive pedagogues will find
ways to teach their students how theories of national power lay at
the foundations of all fundamental rights regimes and progressives activists will construct a congressionally led constitutional
politics that recognizes a strong national government to be the
prerequisite of a strong progressive fundamental rights regime.

72. JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980)
73. SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 248-52.

